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We study the demand for money when agents can optimally choose mean rates of 
consumption and cash holdings over a period.  Consistent with empirical evidence, we 
find that agents do not smooth intra-period consumption. Instead, their rate of 
consumption is positively correlated with their cash position. This positive correlation 
depends on the volatility of the consumption process. When volatility is very low or very 
high, agents choose to consume at a relatively high rate immediately after a cash 
withdrawal, drawing down quite rapidly their cash balances.  Later in the period, their 
rate of consumption and cash depletion is more restrained.  This sizeable deviation from 
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To date, the literature on the demand for money has taken consumption as 
exogenous.  Given the consumption process, which can be deterministic or stochastic, 
agents choose how much cash to withdraw at the start of a cycle.  Cash holdings decline 
between withdrawals in line with the consumption process.  Original contributions to this 
literature were made by Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956), and Miller and Orr (1966).  More 
recent contributions include Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980), Bar-Ilan (1990), Bar-Ilan, 
Perry and Stadje (2004), Baccarin (2009), and Alvarez and Lippi (2009, 2010).   
The assumption of exogenous consumption actually involves two separate 
assumptions. First, total consumption expenditures within the period, and consequently 
total money depleted during the period, are given. Second, the mean rate of consumption 
and cash depletion throughout the period is constant.   
We retain the assumption of a given total consumption within the period as in the 
standard model of money demand. However, we extend the literature on money demand 
by relaxing the assumption of a constant consumption rate during the period. Instead, 
agents choose their mean rates of consumption and cash depletion as a function of their 
cash position.  This causality from cash position to consumption reverses the traditional 
causality from consumption to cash that has characterized the literature on the demand 
for money.  The extension permits the decision about money holdings and consumption 
to be made jointly.           
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Typically in the money demand literature, the consumption path over a period is 
characterized in continuous time as a Brownian motion (BM).
1  The parameters of the 
BM, namely the (negative) rate of drift and the instantaneous standard deviation of the 
process, are exogenous and fully characterize the path of consumption paid with cash 
and, correspondingly, the path of cash depletion.
2  Given the fixed parameters of the BM, 
as well as the opportunity cost of holding cash and the cost of restocking depleted cash 
balances, agents choose the optimal size of a cash withdrawal that minimizes total cost.   
In our model, cash holdings and consumption are characterized by a BM, but 
agents can select the drift.   The model is therefore a drift control model, where the drift 
is the mean rate of consumption and cash depletion.
3 For simplicity, we give agents just 
two opportunities to optimize their consumption rate during the period, first when they 
make their initial cash withdrawal and again when cash balances are reduced by half.
4  
Hence at the start of a typical period, agents choose the optimal cash withdrawal, M*, the 
optimal rate of consumption for as long as money holdings do not reach M*/2, and the 
optimal rate of consumption afterwards.  When cash balances hit their lower bound, 
assumed here to be zero, a cash withdrawal of size M* occurs and a new cycle starts.   
Agents therefore choose M* and two rates of consumption in order to minimize the 
                                                 
1 In Bar-Ilan et al. (2004) and Alvarez and Lippi (2010), the underlying process is a 
combination of Brownian motion and Compound Poisson.  This process is still 
exogenous and not under the control of agents. 
 
2 When applied to firms, the BM process represents the firms’ net revenue in cash. 
 
3 Bar-Ilan, Marion and Perry (2007) illustrate another type of drift control model. 
 
4 Limiting the number of times agents observe their cash position and adjust rates of 
consumption is consistent with the literature on optimal inattention to the stock market 
(e.g. Abel and Eberly (2007)). 
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present value costs of withdrawing and holding money, subject to the constraint on total 
cash consumption over the period.
5   
Numerical results for the model solution show unambiguously that cash 
consumption depends positively on cash holdings. For a wide range of parameter values, 
and without exception, the rate of cash consumption immediately after a cash withdrawal 
is greater than the consumption rate chosen at M*/2.  The difference in the two 
consumption rates is substantial for most parameter values.  Consequently, when agents 
have the opportunity to choose their rates of consumption over the period, they do not 
smooth consumption but prefer to consume at a higher rate initially. 
The degree of consumption smoothing within a period depends on the amount of 
volatility in the consumption process.  When volatility is either very high or very low, 
agents adopt a rapid rate of consumption immediately after a cash withdrawal and then 
slow down that rate later in the period.    For example, high volatility can cause agents to 
choose a rate of consumption in the first half of the period that is many times higher than 
the rate later in the period; low volatility leads consumers to make large purchases 
immediately upon a cash withdrawal. Consequently, the intra-period consumption path 
deviates substantially from consumption smoothing for extreme levels of volatility. For 
moderate volatility, agents get much closer to consumption smoothing within the period.  
Our results are generally consistent with two strands of empirical literature. 
Evidence on the demand for cash indicates that cash consumption increases with the 
amount of cash held.  Alvarez, Pawasutipaisit and Townsend (2010) uncovered evidence 
                                                 
5 For the sake of completeness we later relax the constraint on total cash consumption 
during the period, although this case is less interesting. 
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of simultaneous large cash withdrawals and large cash expenditures using a data set of 
rural Thai households.  Diary surveys on the use of cash versus other means of payment 
present cross-sectional evidence that consumers who use debit cards frequently hold less 
cash than others. This finding suggests a positive correlation between cash holdings and 
cash consumption. In addition, point estimates from money demand regressions generally 
reveal the income elasticity of cash to be less than 0.5, the value implied by the “square-
root formula” derived in Baumol (1952).
6  Boeschoten (1992) suggests this lower income 
elasticity may reflect a deviation from the implicit assumption in the standard money 
demand model of equally spaced expenditures between cash withdrawals. Instead, 
"households spend a large part of money relatively soon after its acquisition" (p.61). 
Similarly, data on household consumption indicate also that the path of within-the-
month consumption may not be well represented by a single drift rate over the period. 
This is especially true for poor consumers who tend to make more cash purchases.  For 
example, Stephens (2003) used the Consumer Expenditure Survey’s Diary Survey to 
examine the response of consumption expenditures to the monthly arrival of Social 
Security checks.  He found that in the first few days following receipt of a Social Security 
check there is an increase in the amount of spending across multiple categories of 
expenditure relative to the day before the check arrives. For poorer households, where 
Social Security represents a more significant portion of income, the spending increase at 
the beginning of the month is more pronounced.  Mastrobuoni and Weinberg (2009) 
found evidence that Social Security recipients without savings do not smooth 
                                                 
6 For example, see Stix (2003) on both the use of debit cards and on income elasticity. 
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consumption over the month.  Instead, these individuals consume 25 percent fewer 
calories the week before receiving Social Security checks relative to the week afterward.
7  
We conclude this section by highlighting the dominant role of cash in household 
transactions, as implied by European survey and diary data.
8  For example, Mooslechner, 
Stix and Wagner (2006) found that cash payments accounted for 86 percent of all direct 
payment transactions by Austrian households in 2005 and for 70 percent of total payment 
value.  A Bundesbank survey (2009) found that cash accounted for 82 percent of all 
direct payment transactions by German consumers in 2008 and for 58 percent in terms of 
value.  Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli (2002) found that currency is very important in the 
Italian payment system.  Further, cash used by these European households for 
transactions was only a small part of total cash in circulation.  The rest was hoarded, used 
in the shadow economy or held abroad.
9 Understanding more fully the management of 
cash holdings is therefore an important goal.     
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section II we present the model 
and its solution.  In Section III we describe the results and offer some intuition.  Section 
IV concludes. A detailed derivation is relegated to the Appendix.  
 
 
                                                 
7 Assuming hyperbolic discounting can also generate non-smooth consumption that 
decreases within the month.  
 
8 In the U.S., households use debit cards more frequently than either cash, credit cards or 
checks. (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 2010). 
 
9 Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010) estimated that the average value of the 
shadow--or cash-- economy was 34.5% of official GDP for 162 countries between 1999 
and 2006/7.  The cash economy was 38.7% of official GDP for a group of 98 developing 
countries and 18.7% for a group of 25 high-income countries.          
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Having described the dynamics of the drift control, we now model the costs 
associated with cash management. There are two types of costs, the cost of holding cash 
(foregone interest) and the cost of withdrawal.
10 The expected discounted cost of holding 
money is the foregone interest, 
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10 There is no cost of controlling the drift. A straightforward extension of this model is to 
introduce such a cost. Such a strategy will make endogenous the number of drifts 
between cash withdrawals.           
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where r is the interest rate and the expectations operator  * M E  is defined as 
                                              *) ) 0 ( ( ) ( * M M X E X EM = ≡ .                               (3) 
Since M(t) is a regenerative process, we can express A1 in terms of a cycle.  Let  
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There is also a cost k associated with each withdrawal. The expected discounted 
cost of all withdrawals is 
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Total cost (TC), minimized by choosing the optimal values for M*, 0   , and  1   , is 
                                                            TC = A1 + A2.                                            (8) 
The solution requires solving for the two integrals in A1 and for  ) (r i θ , i=0,1. 
Define x0(r) as           
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The total cost of cash management is      
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Total cost in (15) is minimized by optimally choosing M* and  i   , i=1,2, given the 
parameters (k, r,σ ).           
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The steady-state density of cash balances (the density when  ∞ → t ) for a  ) , (
2 σ    
BM ,  0 <   , with a trigger x that induces an impulse control of size (y - x) > 0 is
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where 
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2
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2
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11 See Bar-Ilan (1990).          
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where 
                                                         
2 / 2 σ   π i i ≡ ,i=0,1.                                              (20) 
 
This density yields the following steady-state mean value of cash, E(M), as a 
function of the mean values of the two BM processes, E0(M) and E1(M): 
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We first obtain a solution without constraining agents to have a given cash 
consumption over the period.  We discuss the solution in the next section.  We then 
consider the more interesting case where agents are constrained to have a given amount 
of cash consumption over the period.  The total cash withdrawal within a given period of 
length T, say one month, is equal to a given level Y, which is the total cash consumption 
within this period.            
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The mean time between cash withdrawals is denoted as E(T0+T1). Hence the 
constraint on total per-period consumption is, 









, where y is a given parameter.
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The agent optimally chooses M* and the two drifts  0    and  1    by minimizing the cost 
function (15) subject to the constraint (24), given the parameters (k, r, y,σ ).  
 
III. Results 
The model solutions are illustrated in Figures 1-4.  These figures show how the 
solutions vary with volatility (σ) for the following parameter values: k=1, r=0.05, and 
y=5.  Figure 1 illustrates the total cost of cash management.  Figure 2 displays the two 
optimal rates of consumption (the drifts of the two BM processes).  The optimal cash 
withdrawal at the start of the period is shown in Figure 3, while the steady-state mean 
value of cash holdings is given in Figure 4.  The four figures contain not only the model 
solutions (denoted with a solid line), but the solutions for the standard money demand 
model with an exogenous consumption process (denoted with a dashed line).  For the 
standard model, the BM process is characterized by one fixed drift, equal to 5, over the 
                                                 
12 The expected number of cash withdrawals within a period T is T/E(T0+T1), giving total 
cash withdrawn during time T as TM*/E(T0+T1)=Y.          
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period.  We can therefore assess what difference it makes when agents optimize their 
intra-period rates of consumption. 
The solutions to the standard money demand model can be described briefly, as 
they are well known.
13  Higher volatility increases the chance that cash holdings will 
obtain extreme values away from the initial cash level M*. This higher probability is 
reflected in both higher holding costs of large amounts of cash and a higher restocking 
cost, as in Figure 1. To contain the latter cost, higher volatility raises the optimal cash 
withdrawal at the start of the period, M*, the only parameter of choice in this case (Figure 
3).  The average cash holding during the period rises with volatility as in Figure 4 both 
because M* rises and because of the direct effect of volatility on extreme levels of cash. 
Since the consumption process is exogenous, the drift is invariant to increases in 
volatility (Figure 2). 
When agents optimally choose two rates of consumption over the period, the 
additional degrees of freedom allow them to reduce their total cost of cash management. 
This is reflected in Figure 1 as the solid line is always below the dashed one, regardless 
of the volatility level.  When  1 = σ  TCSM = 13.92 (SM=standard model), which is 40 
percent higher than the TC=9.94 of our model. The two costs are closest around  10 = σ  
but diverge again as volatility increases. For  80 = σ , the cost difference is 9.7 percent 
(211.83.23 vs. 232.36). 
The most interesting figure is Figure 2 which shows how agents are able to 
choose their intra-period rates of consumption. First, it is always the case that  
0 1 | | | |     > .  The rate of consumption immediately after a cash withdrawal,  0   , is always 
                                                 
13 See Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980).          
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greater in absolute value that the rate of consumption further into the period,  1   .  This 
outcome is true for a wide range of (k,r,y) parameter values.   Given constraint (24) on 
the average rate of consumption, the two rates chosen by agents lie on either side of the 
exogenous rate faced in the standard money demand model.  Provided the opportunity to 
choose their intra-period rates of consumption, agents deviate from consumption 
smoothing.  
The difference between the two endogenously-determined consumption rates 
depends on volatility.   When volatility is very low or very high, the initial drift  0    is 
highly negative.  Agents choose a rapid rate of cash consumption immediately after a 
cash withdrawal.  For our parameter values, the initial rate of consumption can be many 
times higher than the rate chosen for later in the period.  When volatility lies between 
these extremes, the difference between consumption rates is much smaller.  For some 
intermediate volatilities, consumption is quite smooth (consumption rates of 6.56 and 
later 4.04 for  ) 5 . 14 = σ .
14   
Two observations about these drift results are noteworthy.  First, and most 
importantly, consumption is positively correlated with the level of cash holdings.  The 
observation that the rate of consumption immediately after a cash withdrawal exceeds the 
rate of consumption later in the period is not due to impatience.  It is the outcome of 
choosing an optimal consumption pattern that minimizes the cost of managing cash. 
Moreover, this outcome is consistent with survey and diary evidence on cash holdings 
and consumption patterns within a month.  It is also consistent with point estimates from 
money demand regressions showing an income elasticity of cash under 0.5. 
                                                 
14 The minimum difference between the two consumption rates falls with the average 
consumption rate y. The large difference for extreme levels of volatility persists.          
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Second, the optimal pattern of consumption over the period is consistent with the 
observation that agents sometimes choose to make large purchases immediately after a 
cash withdrawal.  (See Alvarez et al, 2010.)    Based on Figure 2, we see that agents are 
more inclined to make these large purchases when volatility is very low or very high.  
When there is little uncertainty, agents may be more willing to make large cash purchases 
at the beginning of the period because their future expenditures are predictable. When 
there is a great deal of uncertainty, like that arising from high and unstable inflation, 
agents may prefer to make large cash payments immediately after a cash withdrawal 
instead of waiting. During the German hyperinflation as well as contemporary high-
inflation episodes in Argentina, Brazil, and elsewhere, it was common for households to  
purchase as many items as possible immediately after a wage payment.  
In the absence of volatility, the initial drift  0    goes to negative infinity, the 
weight 0 0 = ω and E(M)=E1(M).
15  In this case, half of the period’s consumption (M*/2) 
takes place immediately upon a cash withdrawal; the other half is spent evenly during the 
month at a rate that is half of average period consumption.  The cash spent immediately 
upon withdrawal, one-half of the withdrawal in our model, does not affect average cash 
holdings within the period.  Alvarez and Lippi (2010) discuss a similar phenomenon and 
Alvarez et al. (2010) provide empirical support for this outcome.   
Figure 3 shows that the optimal cash withdrawal is higher when agents choose 
their rates of intra-period consumption rather than face an exogenous consumption 
process.   The reason is straightforward.  With a higher initial consumption rate, agents 
                                                 
15 In Figure 2, the range of this result is  6 < σ . When the constraint on total cash 
consumption (y) is reduced, this range narrows, getting closer to  0 σ = . 
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choose to withdraw more cash M* and deplete it more rapidly until M*/2. The larger is 
the deviation of the initial and average consumption rates, the larger the deviation of the 
size of withdrawal.  Note also that unlike the standard model, M* is not monotonically 
increasing with volatility. When the initial drift rate drops dramatically (when σ  is 
around 6-10), M* drops correspondingly. 
Figure 4 shows average money holdings over the period for our model and for the 
standard one. When  5 < σ , EM<EMSM. When volatility increases, this inequality is 
reversed and the difference widens. This result is due to the lower consumption rate 
during the second part of the cycle, as average money holdings depends nonlinearly on 
the reciprocal of the consumption rate.
16 Note that despite making a larger cash 
withdrawal and holding more cash on average, the pattern of consumption spending 
ensures that the total cost of cash management is less for our model than in the case 
where agents have no discretion over their rates of consumption.  
It might also be informative to note how the solutions differ when agents have the 
opportunity to optimize over their rates of consumption but do not face the constraint on 
total cash consumption over the period.  We pursue two different approaches. The first 
involves choosing the size of withdrawal and one drift rate by minimizing the total cost 
(15) with respect to M* and  1 0       = = . The second approach allows for the 
unconstrained choice of two drifts by minimizing (15) with respect to M*,  0    and  1   . As 
expected, without a constraint on consumption, agents will choose low consumption 
rates, but these rates increase with volatility. Also, when agents can choose consumption 
                                                 
16 There is also very narrow range around  6 = σ  where EM drops with σ  together with a 
large drop of M*.          
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rates and money holdings simultaneously as in the second version above, they choose to 
consume faster when they hold more cash.   
 
IV.  Conclusion 
This paper studies the demand for cash when consumers have discretion over their 
rate of consumption during the period. A consequence of this extension is that agents 
always consume at a faster rate when they hold more cash. This deviation from 
consumption smoothing is larger when volatility takes extreme values. For intermediate 
values of volatility, consumption is smoother and cash holdings are closer to the values 
predicted by the standard model of money demand. 
Although not pursued here, a straightforward application of this model is to 
evaluate numerically the income- and interest- rate elasticities of the demand for cash. 
Plotting E(M), the mean level of cash, as a function of the average consumption rate y 
and the interest rate r will yield these elasticities. The graph of E(M) as a function of r is 
potentially important as it allows for the computation of the welfare cost of inflation and 
a comparison with the welfare cost in the standard model.   
An extension of the model would be to allow for n>2 drifts, where the drift 
changes whenever M(t) drops by M*/n.  If each control of drift incurs a (fixed or 
proportional) cost, then the number and timing of drift changes is chosen optimally to 
minimize the cost of control in addition to the other costs. Another possible extension 
would be to consider consumption processes other than BM such as Compound Poisson. 
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This appendix presents the derivation of the total expected cost of cash management. 
Given that M(t) is a regenerative process with a cycle T0 + T 1, we can write the 
total expected discounted cost of managing cash  ) (r TC  as 












M + + + = ∫ ∫
− − θ θ θ        (A.1)   
Grouping the two terms  ) (r TC  on the left-hand side of (A.1) gives the expression for the 
total cost, equations (6)-(8).  What remains on the right-hand-side of (A.1) is then the 
sum of the two costs associated with cash management—the holding cost and the 
withdrawal cost.  These two costs are called  1 A , equation (6), and  2 A , equation (7). 




z i dt t M e E r
0
) ( ), ( θ , i =0,1, we generalize 
the technique used in Bar-Ilan et al. (2004) and Perry and Stadje (1999). The main tool of 
our analysis is a martingale N(t). It follows from Ito’s Lemma (see chapter 5 of Chung 
and Williams (1990)) that if U is a BM with exponent   α α σ α ϕ − =
2 2 ) 2 / 1 ( ) ( , 
V = V(t): t ≥0 { } is an adapted process of bounded variation on finite intervals, and 
W = W(t): t ≥ 0 { } satisfies W(t)=U(t)+V(t), then 
∫ ∫
− − − − − − + =
t
s W t W W
t
s W s dV e e e ds e t N
0
) ( ) ( ) 0 (
0
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
α α α α α α ϕ                             (A.2)   
is a martingale.  We use this martingale as follows. Since{ } 0 : ) ( ≥ t t M  is a regenerative 
process with cycle T0 + T 1, we divide the cycle into two parts and analyze each of them 
separately. The first part is { } 0 : ) ( T t t M ≤ , which is a BM with  *, ) 0 ( M M =  
, 2 / * ) ( 0 M T M =  drift  ) , ( 0 ∞ −∞ ∈    and variance  0
2 > σ . The second part is          
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{ } 1 0 : ) ( T t T t M ≤ <  which is BM with  , 2 / * ) ( 0 M T M =   , 0 ) ( 1 0 = +T T M drift 
) , ( 1 ∞ −∞ ∈    and variance  0
2 > σ . 
To use the martingale (A.2) on the first part of the cycle, set 
α   α σ α ϕ α ϕ 0
2 2
0 ) 2 / 1 ( ) ( ) ( − = = ,  ) ( ) ( t M t U = ,  t r t V ) / ( ) ( α = , and 
t r t M t W ) / ( ) ( ) ( α + = . Then 
s d e r e e ds e t N
t t
rs s M rt t M M rs s M ∫ ∫
− − − − − − − − − + =
0 0
) ( ) ( * ) (
0 0 ) ( ) (
α α α α α ϕ                  (A.3)   
is a martingale. By setting  ) ( ) 0 ( 0 0 * 0 * T N E N E M M = , we obtain 
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M ∫ ∫









* 0 ) (
α α α α α ϕ .   (A.4)    
Rearranging terms in (A.4), using 2 / * ) ( 0 M T M = , yields  
  ) ( ) ) ( ( 0












M rs s M
M θ α ϕ
α α α α α − − − − − − − + − = + − = − ∫     (A.5) 




M e E r
− = θ . 
 Let x0 be the positive root of the quadratic equation 
0 ) 2 / ( ) ( 0
2 2
0 = − − = − r r α   α σ α ϕ , so that 








σ     r
r x
+ +
= .                                                 (A.6)        
Equation (A.6) is equation (9), section 2. Substituting  ) ( 0 r x = α  into equation (A.5) 
makes the left-hand-side equal to zero. Equation (A.5) therefore yields the following 
equation for  ) ( 0 r θ ,    
                                
2 / * ) (
0
0 ) (
M r x e r
− = θ .                                                        (A.7)                   
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 Equation (A.7) is equation (10).  
Now substitute equation (A.7) into (A.5), divide both sides by  ) ( 0 α ϕ − r , take the 


















dt t M e E
θ   θ
,                           (A.8)     
which is equation (11). 
The solution technique for the second part of the cycle is similar and yields 




























Figure 1. Total Cost 

















Figure 2.  Intra-period consumption rates 
Dashed line is standard model; solid lines are drift control model. Bottom solid line is 
initial consumption rate  ) ( 0   ; top solid line is the second rate  ) ( 1    
 















Figure 3.  Optimal Cash Withdrawal 
Dashed line is standard model; solid line is drift control model 
 















Figure 4. Average Intra-Period Cash Holdings 
Dashed line is standard model; solid line is drift control model 